The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
Union)For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON AND MADISON: To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was
that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic
council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated
institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present
Confederation of the American States.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign
states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council
had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged
necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on
war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the
members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force
of the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members.
The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense
riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right
of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those
who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the
efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend
and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath,
and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply
sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances,
they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation.
The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times,
one of the principal engines by which government was then
maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against
refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on
the necessary occasions.
Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory.
The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered
by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political
capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence
the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the
confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in
awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest.
Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece
seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it
twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of
Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.
It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the
deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the
weaker; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia
and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or
fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common
enemy. The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic
vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage.
After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the
Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned
out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The
Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer
partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become
masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated
the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency
of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful
members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The
smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to
revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had
become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were
courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the
necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of
the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to
establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy,
Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they
had acquired, became first rivals and then enemies; and did each
other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes.
Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the
celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and
slavery of the Athenians who had begun it.
As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by
internal dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh
calamities from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some
consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the
Amphictyonic council, according to the superstition of the age,
imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being
abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. The
Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the
authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated god. The
latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of
Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly
seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned
against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won
over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by
their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic
council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the
confederacy.
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which
this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a
judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter
confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never have
worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the
vast projects of Rome.
The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of
Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much
wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear,
that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means
equally deserved it.
The cities composing this league retained their municipal
jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect
equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole
and exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving
ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of
appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who
commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten
of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess
of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when
assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two
praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single
one was preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs,
the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this
effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left
in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner
compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was
brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an
abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption
of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which
she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her
government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a
very material difference in the genius of the two systems.
It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain
of this curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and
regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light
would be thrown by it on the science of federal government, than by
any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted.
One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians
who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the
renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the
arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice
in the administration of its government, and less of violence and
sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities
exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe
Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the popular
government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders
in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS THERE
TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY.
We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did
not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less
that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system.
The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate
of the republic.
Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the
Achaeans, which comprehended the less important cities only, made
little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a
victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and
Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, however, a
different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practiced
among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest;
the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny
of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing
out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken
their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was
followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their
tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus.
Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal dissensions
from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and seemed ready
to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta
and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp
on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the
league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who,
as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon.
This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led
by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the
Achaeans, and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with
the Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of their
engagements with the league.
The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to
Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former
oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the
Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful
neighbor of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army
quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achaeans soon
experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally
is but another name for a master. All that their most abject
compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise
of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon
provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The
Achaeans, though weakened by internal dissensions and by the
revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians
and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding
themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they
once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the
succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was
made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued.
A new crisis ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among it
members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular
leaders became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen.
The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans
had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity,
already proclaimed universal liberty1 throughout Greece. With
the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the
league, by representing to their pride the violation it committed on
their sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of
Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and
such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome
found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had
commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with
chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this
important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one
lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean
constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal
bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the
head.
PUBLIUS.
1 This was but another name more specious for the independence
of the members on the federal head.
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