FEDERALIST No. 9
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
For the Independent Journal. - Hamilton.
To the People of the State of New York:
A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace
and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction
and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the
petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations
of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were
continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions
by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they
exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast
to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and
then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a
mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing
scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous
waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of
glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with
a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish
us to lament that the vices of government should
pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright
talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils
that produced them have been so justly celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics
the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not
only against the forms of republican government, but against
the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free
government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have
indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends
and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared
on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have,
in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms.
And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation
of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally
permanent monuments of their errors.
But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched
of republican government were too just copies of the originals
from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable
to have devised models of a more perfect structure,
the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged
to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible.
The science of politics, however, like most other sciences,
has received great improvement. The efficacy of various
principles is now well understood, which were either not
known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular
distribution of power into distinct departments; the intro-
duction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of
courts composed of judges holding their offices during good
behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature
by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries,
or have made their principal progress towards perfection
in modern times. They are means, and powerful means,
by which the excellences of republican government may be
retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this
catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of
popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however
novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle
which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
new Constitution; I mean the enlargement of the orbit within
which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the
dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several
smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that
which immediately concerns the object under consideration.
It will, however, be of use to examine the principle in its application
to a single State, which shall be attended to in another
place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction
and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase
their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It
has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and
has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the
subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have,
with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of
Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a
republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised
of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another
part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences
of the principle to which they subscribe with such
ready acquiescence.
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics,
the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short
of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina,
nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the
models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his
description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as
the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either
of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of
splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing,
tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing
discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or
contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the
other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma;
and have even been bold enough to hint at the division
of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy,
such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty
offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications
to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of
personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
happiness of the people of America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to another
place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to
remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been
most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only
dictate a reduction of the size of the more considerable members
of the Union, but would not militate against their being
all comprehended in one confederate government. And this
is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present
interested.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in
opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly
treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extending
the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages
of monarchy with those of republicanism.
“It is very probable,” (says he) “that mankind would have
been obliged at length to live constantly under the government
of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of
constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican,
together with the external force of a monarchical government.
I mean a confederate republic.
This form of government is a convention by which several
smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, which
they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies
that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of
new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as
to be able to provide for the security of the united body.
A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force,
may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form
of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority,
he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and
credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great
influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue
a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him
with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower
him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate
states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses
creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain
sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on
the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates
preserve their sovereignty.
As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys
the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its
external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association,
of all the advantages of large monarchies.’’
I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting
passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the
principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually
remove the false impressions which a misapplication of
other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at
the same time, an intimate connection with the more imme-
diate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency
of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised
between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The
essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction
of its authority to the members in their collective capacities,
without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed.
It is contended that the national council ought to have
no concern with any object of internal administration. An
exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been
insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government.
These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are
supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed
happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated
in the manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes
to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in
most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve
to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute
rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course
of this investigation that as far as the principle contended for
has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and
imbecility in the government.
The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be
“an assemblage of societies,’’ or an association of two or more
states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects
of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So
long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished;
so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for
local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination
to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact
and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The
proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of
the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the
national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation
in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive
and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully
corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the
idea of a federal government.
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three
cities or republics, the largest were entitled to three votes in
the common council, those of the middle class to two, and the
smallest to one. The common council had the appointment of
all the judges and magistrates of the respective cities. This was
certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their internal
administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively
appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment
of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking
of this association, says: “Were I to give a model of an excellent
Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia.’’ Thus
we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within
the contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall
be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an
erroneous theory.
Publius
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